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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the potential of U.S. Naval Forward Presence in the Western 
Pacific to stabilize economic markets around the world in the event of a crisis in the 
South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits.  It utilizes a scenario analogous to that of the 
1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis that it sets in the year 2005.  The scenario utilizes existing 
military, political and economic conditions in the region to forecast likely behavior of the 
main actors.  The thesis concludes that U.S. Naval Forward Presence is the vital 
ingredient to protect U.S. interests in the region, discourage crisis escalation, and stabilize 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to the island of Taiwan in 1949, the 
government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has vowed to eliminate its 
Nationalist rival.  The United States has stood as guarantor of Taiwanese independence at 
least since the Korean War, which seemingly has placed the two countries on a collision 
course.  The latest of several confrontations occurred in 1995-96, when the United States 
dispatched carrier battle groups (CVBG) to discourage Beijing’s attempt to influence the 
outcome of the Taiwanese elections by firing missiles near the island.  U.S. policy seeks 
peaceful resolution of the PRC-ROC differences so that unification, if it comes, will be 
voluntary. 
Unfortunately, time does not seem to be working to diffuse tensions in the region 
for several reasons.  First, Taiwan is evolving toward an increasingly democratic form of 
government, which has made it less willing to contemplate union with an authoritarian 
PRC.  Second, one of the greatest constraints in the past on PRC behavior toward Taiwan 
has been fear of Soviet attack should Beijing become overly committed in the South 
China Sea.  Recent Sino-Russian rapprochement has removed this threat, hence freeing 
Beijing to look east.  The third factor in a shifting strategic equation is the growing might 
of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA).  The U.S. Department of Defense report to 
Congress, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, dated 26 February 1999, concludes 
that, by 2005, China’s ability to implement a naval blockade of Taiwan, to establish air 
superiority over the island, conduct an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, and to gain 
information dominance will have increased markedly. 
This thesis adopts as its premise a hypothetical crisis in PRC-ROC relations that 
erupts just after the Taiwanese parliamentary elections scheduled for December 2004, in 
which the PLA will use the threat of military force to influence post-election ROC 
political behavior.  This crisis will elicit a response by U.S. Naval forces.  The working 
hypothesis of this thesis is that U.S. Naval Forward Presence will still be sufficient to 
deter PRC behavior, despite the evolving strategic environment in the Western Pacific.  
The implications of this for the U.S. Navy’s portion of the QDR process are huge.  As the 
Bush administration searches for best direction to take the Navy, it may cast doubt on 
 xv
whether Naval Forward Presence and its core element of the CVBG is the best strategy 
for the United States.  The importance of proper funding is critical for the U.S. Navy 
fully to be prepared for the challenges of the future.  Only in this way can the United 
States Commander in Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC) reserve the capability to make sound 
decisions based on a realistic assessment of U.S. military capabilities in a time of crisis. 
The U.S. Navy in the Pacific theater in the form of Naval Forward Presence is vital to 
regional stability.  This thesis will argue that the U.S. Navy has in the past had an 
important role to play in enforcing U.S. policy toward the China/Taiwan dispute, and will 
continue to do so in the future.  The benefits of providing a stable political environment 
have generated enormous economic wealth.  Thus the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis 
impacted a variety of markets including oil, and bolstered the need for a Naval Forward 
Presence to guard the economic interests of the United States and its major trading 
partners.  This recognition should enhance the prospects for the U.S. Navy to acquire 




I. INTRODUCTION  
A. DESCRIPTION  
Since the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to the island of Taiwan in 1949, the 
government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has vowed to eliminate its 
Nationalist rival.  On at least two occasions during the Cold War – 1954 and 1958 -- the 
United States dispatched ships to demonstrate Washington’s resolve in preventing a 
forceful absorption of the island by the mainland.  More recently, in 1995-96, the United 
States twice dispatched carrier battle groups (CVBG) to counter Beijing’s attempt to 
underscore its readiness to use military force both to Taipei and to Washington by 
conducting military exercises, which included firing missiles around the island.  
Unfortunately, for several reasons, time does not seem to be working in favor of U.S. 
policy, which seeks a peaceful resolution of PRC/ROC differences so that unification, if 
it comes, will be voluntary.  First, the evolution of Taiwan’s increasingly democratic and 
open government has made it less willing to contemplate union with an authoritarian 
PRC.  Second, Taiwan’s evolution towards a more open government is seen as a direct 
challenge to the Communist Party, which controls the PRC.  Third, as Taipei and Beijing 
have evolved in opposite directions politically, Washington appears increasingly 
determined to protect Taipei in the event of an attempt at a violent unification by the 
PRC.  President Bush has declared United States resolve to do “whatever it took to help 
Taiwan defend herself.”1 
A fourth complicating factor is the position of Russia.  One reason that Beijing 
can afford to be increasingly assertive toward Taiwan is that it no longer has a strong 
Soviet Union threatening its northern flank.  A major reason that the PRC backed down 
in the 1954 and 1958 crises was that it was discouraged from action by Moscow.  In the 
1960s and 1970s, relations between the two communist powers worsened to the point that 
the Soviet Union was seen as China’s primary military threat.  But, the end of the Cold 
War, combined with the policies of the George W. Bush administration, most notably on 
e former communist rivals closer together.  Since 1992, missile defense, has driven th                                                 
1 Charles Gibson, “Taiwan,” Congressional Record article 5 of 50, Interview with President Bush on 
ABC’s “Good Morning America”, 25 April 2001; accessed on 2 May 2001; available from 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:5:./temp/~r107lrmBui; Internet. 
1 
Russia has become a major supplier of modern weapons systems for the PRC’s People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Air Force (PLAAF), while Chinese orders help to 
keep Russia’s arms manufacturers solvent. 
A fifth factor working against peaceful resolution may be an increasing military 
influence over PRC policy towards Taiwan.  Closer relations between Russia and China, 
most notably in arms transfers, combined with China’s indigenous military 
modernization, have increased the PRC’s ability to resolve its dispute with Taiwan by 
force.  While it is impossible to know for sure, increased military capability, when allied 
with the PRC regime’s evolution toward a market economy, may actually have increased 
the PLA’s influence over PRC policy toward Taiwan.  The pursuit of a market economy 
actually throws into question the Marxist foundations of the PRC party legitimacy.  This 
gives the PLA, which sees itself as the repository of both socialist legitimacy and Chinese 
national interests, increased leverage over a party in transition.  Political leaders may be 
bullied by the military into taking strong action over Taiwan, both to solidify their 
political base and because they become convinced that a military solution offers a greater 
chance of success.  Hence, enhanced offensive military capability may actually tempt 
Beijing to employ military force against Taipei, as the Taiwan issue directly challenges 
the sensitive issue of CCP (Chinese Communist Party) legitimacy.  The U.S. Department 
of Defense report to Congress, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, dated 26 
February 1999, concludes that, by 2005, China’s ability to implement a naval blockade of 
Taiwan, to establish air superiority over the island, conduct an amphibious invasion of 
Taiwan, and to gain information dominance will have increased markedly.2  The U.S. 
Department of Defense also believes that China is modernizing its military to achieve 
regional dominance.  Finally, the study asserts that, “Beijing believes that the Peoples 
Liberation Army can develop asymmetrical abilities in certain niches—such as advanced 
cruise missiles and conventional short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).”3  Niche 
weapon procurement supports the PRC intent to develop an advanced military capacity to 
                                                 
2 “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 




deter third party intervention in Taiwan and to protect claims in the multilaterally 
disputed South China Sea.  
This thesis examines a hypothetical crisis in PRC-ROC relations that erupts just 
after the Taiwanese parliamentary elections scheduled for December 2004, in which the 
PLA uses the threat of military force to influence post-election ROC political behavior.  
This crisis would require a response by U.S. Naval forces.  This scenario forms a 
plausible basis for an assessment of the implications of the Taiwan question for the U.S. 
security posture for a number of reasons.  First, it closely parallels that of 1995-96, when 
the PRC, in reaction to a U.S. decision to give ROC President Lee Teng-hui a visa to the 
United States, orchestrated overtly aggressive amphibious maneuvers and missile 
launches by the PLA.  Second, China’s acquisition of asymmetrical military capabilities, 
as forecasted by the U.S. intelligence community, increasingly could militarize the PRC 
political process due to the fact that Beijing will be able to back up political rhetoric 
towards Taiwan with military might.  Third, Beijing would likely garner political support 
from Russia, due to increased mutual opposition to U.S. policies in the Far East and over 
missile defense, and therefore would be emboldened to take a hard line toward Taiwan.  
Fourth, Washington is more likely to be distracted by its “war on terrorism” declared by 
President Bush following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Towers in 
New York and on the Pentagon.  In pursuit of the war on international terrorism, 
increasing amounts of U.S. intelligence and military assets are being absorbed in the 
Middle East and South Asia.  This level of commitment of U.S. assets toward the “war on 
terrorism” will most likely continue even after the situation in Afghanistan is stabilized.  
Therefore, Beijing might reasonably conclude that Washington’s priorities have changed 
and be encouraged to accelerate their aggressive policy towards Taiwan.  Finally, 
Washington would most likely respond to PRC aggression toward Taiwan by the 
deployment of one or more carrier battle groups (CVBGs) to the region.  Not only would 
this confirm a pattern of previous U.S. behavior.  But also, the current Republican-led 
U.S. administration would be even more inclined to adopt a resolute response to PRC 
provocation with a show of force in order to distinguish its China policy from the more 
accommodating approach of its Clinton predecessor.  
3 
1. Background/Justification/Importance 
U.S. intelligence has assessed that China intends to modernize its military as a 
deterrent to third-party intervention in Taiwan and to protect claims in the South China 
Sea.4  Currently, the PLA is obtaining advanced weapons, including indigenously 
produced cruise and ballistic missiles, and openly purchasing sophisticated Russian naval 
and aircraft weapon systems.5  Future military confrontations between Taiwan and China 
may require the United States to display a naval show of force, as was the case in the 
1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis.  A future Taiwan Straits situation may be made even more 
complicated by the fact that the PLA, with its relatively newly acquired advanced weapon 
systems, may lack the competence to coordinate the weapon systems in a crisis.  This will 
make its response difficult to predict.  What is clear, however, is that the political 
situation will have become militarized due to the fact that the PRC has acquired more 
capable weapons systems so as directly to confront the U.S. Navy.  Furthermore, the PLA 
may have a greater say in their use.  
Any crisis dealing with China and Taiwan, or with the South China Sea, will 
involve a U.S. Naval Forward Presence.  The U.S. Navy has accepted this responsibility 
since the emergence of a communist regime in China in 1949 and will justify funding to 
prepare for this possibility via the QDR process.  The importance of proper funding is 
critical for the U.S. Navy fully to prepare for the challenges of the future, giving the 
Commander in Charge of the Pacific (CINCPAC) the ability to make sound decisions 
based on a realistic assessment of U.S. military capabilities in a time of crisis.  
The U.S. Navy in the Pacific theater will continue to have an important stabilizing 
effect in the form of forward presence.  This thesis will argue that the U.S. Navy has in 
the past had an important role to play in enforcing U.S. policy toward the China-Taiwan 
dispute and will continue to do so in the future.  In addition to its strategic importance, 
U.S. Naval presence in the Western Pacific also brings with it an element of economic 
stability.  By examining how the 1995-6 Taiwan Straits crisis had a positive impact on a 
variety of markets, including oil, a case can be made that a U.S. Naval Forward Presence 
brings about significant economic benefits to the United States and to its major trading 




partners.  This recognition should enhance the prospects for the U.S. Navy to acquire 
adequate funding during the current and future QDR processes. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis comes from a variety of primary and some secondary 
sources.  It focuses on the relationship of the United States, Taiwan and PRC.  
Additionally, the thesis makes use of books, scholarly articles and official reports as 
research sources on the evolving political climate in the region, as well as the 
technological capabilities of PLA, Taiwanese and U.S. naval forces. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
The thesis looks first at the evolution of U.S.-PRC policy toward Taiwan by 
exploring the history of China’s attempt to absorb Taiwan, the PLA’s modernization 
program, and how it clashes with U.S. goals in the region.  It then posits a scenario for a 
hypothetical U.S.-PRC confrontation over Taiwan set in the year 2005.  This year was 
chosen because Beijing may be tempted, as in 1995-96, to influence, through a display of 
military force, the post Legislative Yuan elections, where the Democratic Progressive 
Party has won a majority of seats.  The scenario presents a plausible course for a U.S.-
PRC confrontation over Taiwan.  Finally, the thesis offers a projection on the likely 
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 II. THE ROAD TO 2005; THE EVOLUTION OF US-PRC POLICY 
OVER TAIWAN 
A. UNDOING THE “CENTURY OF HUMILIATION” 
Beginning in the mid-19th century, European and American intrusions into the 
Western Pacific initiated a slow disintegration of China’s traditional dynastic system.  
The Chinese empire’s inability correctly to assess and adapt to the new threat of 
Westerners approaching from the sea, an anomaly from their historic problem of meeting 
threats in Central Asia, gradually destroyed the millennia-old framework of dynastic rule.  
That China’s antiquated army and navy were no match for Western militaries became 
evident in the first Opium War, which ended with the Treaty of Nanking in August of 
1842.  This and subsequent treaties, forced on a reluctant China by victorious Western 
states, became known as “unequal treaties” because they required the Qing Emperor to 
agree to policies that forfeited much of China’s sovereignty and they were not reciprocal.  
The result of the Opium War inaugurated what the Chinese call the “century of 
humiliation” as other incursions, wars, and treaties that granted new concessions and 
added new privileges for the foreigners followed the Treaty of Nanking.  Foreign 
settlements established in the “treaty ports” created by these “unequal” settlements 
became pockets of foreign sovereignty over which China had no jurisdiction.  Their 
security was assured by the presence of their respective warships and troops and their 
legality rested on extraterritoriality.  Reform movements within China, like the “Self-
Strengthening” movement of the 1860s and the “Hundred Days’” reform of 1898, failed 
to reunify the country and reverse the death spiral of the Qing dynasty.  
The Western powers were not the only countries to intervene in China.  Following 
the Meiji restoration of 1868, Japan quickly joined the ranks of powers making claims on 
Beijing.  Japan defeated China in the war of 1894-95.  The Treaty of Shimonoseki forced 
China to cede Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan, pay a huge indemnity, permit the 
establishment of Japanese industries in four treaty ports, and recognize Japanese 
hegemony over Korea. 
The erosion of the Qing dynasty’s claim to the “mandate of heaven” to rule over 
China resulted in the Revolution of 1911.  Sun Yat-sen led the revolution, but Yuan 
7 
Shikai took over as head of the Chinese Republic.  Although the revolution did overturn 
the Qing dynasty, it failed to unify the country.  By 1915, much of China escaped the 
control of the Republic and instead was ruled by regional warlords.  Japan, taking 
advantage of China’s disarray, placed upon China twenty-one demands, which reflected 
Japan’s attempt to turn north China into a Japanese protectorate.  
Sun Yat-sen, China’s new revolutionary leader, tried unsuccessfully to enlist 
Western support to resist Tokyo’s encroachment.  Therefore, in 1923, he turned for 
protection to the Soviet Union, which had recently achieved its own revolution.  The 
Soviet leadership initiated a dual policy of support for both Sun Yat-sen and the newly 
established Chinese Communist Party.  Sun Yat-sen’s untimely death cleared the way for 
his protégé, Chiang Kai-shek.  By 1927, the Nationalist Government, led by Chiang Kai-
shek, had nominally unified China under the Kuomintang (KMT) with a successful 
military campaign known as the Northern Expedition.  China’s unification under the 
KMT was an imperfect process because Chiang had been forced to co-opt a number of 
warlords by allowing them to exercise a great degree of autonomy.  Nevertheless, this 
arrangement, though unsatisfactory, freed Chiang to turn on the Communist elements 
within the Nationalist Party.  Though successful in driving the Communists from the 
large cities, they established themselves in remote areas of the country and held out 
against Chiang’s offensives.  Civil war between the Nationalist government and the CCP 
became a constant feature of Chinese history until the ultimate victory of Mao Zedong in 
1949 
8 
China’s instability enhanced Japan’s pursuit of regional hegemony and provided a 
vehicle for the Communists rise to power.  Hungry for raw materials and pressed by a 
growing population, Japan initiated the seizure of Manchuria in September 1931, 
renamed it Manchukuo the following year, and established ex-Qing emperor Puyi as head 
of the puppet regime there.  The loss of Manchuria, with its vast raw materials and war 
industries, was a blow to the Nationalist economy.  As China was distracted by civil war, 
Japan in 1937 began a full-fledged invasion of China.  Successive Japanese offensives 
drove the Nationalists ultimately to the city of Chungking in the far western part of the 
country.  As the Japanese were interested only in occupying the major arteries of 
communication, the CCP was able to infiltrate and cntrol large sections of the country 
behind Japanese lines.  This became a key factor in the CCP’s success in the renewed 
civil war that followed the defeat of Japan in 1945.  Japan’s surrender also meant that 
Taiwan would revert to China.  But after the Chinese Civil War concluded with the defeat 
of the Nationalists, Taiwan became the Nationalists refuge.  Beijing today sees Taiwan’s 
defiance of its authority as part of the unfinished business dating from the Chinese civil 
war. 
The victorious PRC, led by Mao Zedong, set out to restore stability, sovereignty 
and regional dominance to China.  Mao sought to give the Chinese people a sense of 
order after the many years of civil war and chaos.  The restoration of Chinese 
sovereignty, so often violated in the previous century, became critical for the credibility 
and legitimacy of the PRC in the eyes of its own people.  Soon after the PRC took control 
of mainland China, the first confrontations began between Washington and Beijing that 
firmed up the U.S. policy of containment.  The United States emerged to fill the political 
vacuum in the Western Pacific created by Japan’s defeat.  Insurgent communist and 
nationalist movements churned Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines.  With the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the protection of the KMT government on Taiwan 
became a cornerstone of Washington’s containment policy.  Twice, in 1954 and 1958, 
Taiwan narrowly avoided becoming a Cold War battleground.  U.S. policy over the past 
50 years has helped to stabilize the Pacific arena.  More importantly, future U.S. policies 
will affect and in some cases dictate Chinese actions toward Taiwan. 
PRC long-term policy goals are: first, to make China a regional power and 
second, to exercise limited global influence, which will expand as its economy and 
resources grow.  Finally, Beijing seeks to complete the agenda of national reunification.6  
After the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976 and normalization of diplomatic ties with the 
United States in 1979, China perceived itself as a developing power whose natural 
resources, manpower, nuclear capable forces, seat on the UN Security Council and 
growing economy gave it some of the attributes of a world power.7  The framework of 
                                                 
6 David M. Lampton, “China and the Strategic Quadrangle: Foreign Policy Continuity in an Age of 
Discontinuity,” in Michael Mandelbaum, The Strategic Quadrangle, (New York: A Council on Foreign 
Relations Book, 1995), p. 66. 
9 
7 “Pentagon’s Annual Report on the Military Power of China,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the 
FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, 23 June 2000; accessed on 22 July 2001; available from 
foreign policy that was established by Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, in 1982 was 
called China’s “independent foreign policy.”8  Although this policy was developed 
during the Cold War, it has served China well during the post-Cold War era. 
The foreign policy framework established by Deng Xiaoping is based on 4 key 
assumptions: (1) great power conflicts are decades away; (2) economic strength is 
paramount; (3) regional conflicts will occur but East Asia should remain stable; (4) the 
PRC has much to gain by foreign investment.9  Bilateral ties with the United States are 
critical for the policy to succeed, along with improved economic relations with all states 
in the Pacific Rim.  As China increases its economic prowess, its military strength must 
evolve to buttress its policies.  To prepare for this new era, the PRC is pursuing military 
reform with a view to improve both intelligence collection and to restructure the PLA as 
a smaller more capable force.  Jiang Zemin, Deng’s successor, continues to follow this 
general policy direction, which is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
The Chinese vision is not a far-fetched dream, but a realistic blueprint for internal 
and external development.  China’s economic growth has averaged seven percent since 
the early 1980s, which has made China the sixth largest economy in the world.  During 
the same period, the United States economic growth has remained at two to three percent 
annually.  Of course, China started from a much lower scale of development than the 
United States.  Moreover, China’s history does cast some doubt on its ability to 
modernize successfully and become an economic and military powerhouse.  The 
Communist Party, known for its inefficiencies, will play the largest role in China’s 
modernization.  The Party will have to evolve to the point that it embraces privatization 
of the economy and fosters a creative environment for its scholars, scientists and 
entrepreneurs.  Making these changes would provide China with the chance to become 
the market of great fortune the West has believed it to be since Marco Polo first reported 
its riches in 1295. 
                                                 
http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=2000/8/7/160447; Internet. 
8 Lampton, Ibid., p. 64. 
9 Lampton, Ibid., p. 65. 
10 
1. PRC Attempts to Assimilate Taiwan 
In December 1954, the United States and Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense 
Treaty, which secured Taiwan’s protection under the umbrella of the U.S. containment 
policy.  The treaty prohibited Chiang Kai-shek, then Nationalist leader of the ROC, from 
trying to “recover the mainland” by force.  Nevertheless, on two occasions, Mao’s China 
mounted military offensives against Taiwan.  They contested I-chiang-shan Island in 
1955 and Quemoy and Ma-tsu Islands in 1958.  These offensives increased the 
Nationalist government’s dependence on the United States for military support.  The 
ROC and PRC have been in a stalemate ever since. 
With the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and 
PRC in 1979, each side released a statement laying out its policy toward the Taiwan 
situation.  The United States resolved that the Chinese themselves settle the Taiwan issue 
peacefully.10  For its part, the PRC vigorously argues that the “reunification” of their 
country is entirely a Chinese internal affair.11  The PRC’s patience shows signs of 
wearing thin after many years of failing to negotiate “reunification.”  The 1990s were 
highlighted by ups and downs of cross-strait talks.  The PRC proposed a “one-country 
two systems” approach, which Taiwan declined to accept.  Beijing’s frustrations were 
routinely manifested in the publication of its defense white papers, which restated 
China’s claim of entitlement to use force against Taiwan.  Unlike previous white papers, 
however, the 2000 version reserved the right to attack if Taiwan refused “sine die” to 
conclude “the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations.”12 
2. Economic Exclusion Zones 
China’s search for energy sources to feed its rapidly expanding economy has 
generated an expansive “economic exclusion zones” (EEZ) policy.  The PRC, since the 
early 1950s, has laid claim to the entire South China Sea as depicted on the map below, 
Figure 1.  This forms a second area of potential conflict between Beijing and several 
countries, including the United States.  Currently, seven countries hold direct claims to 
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islands in the Spratly and Paracel maritime regions based on United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  From a historical perspective, the Chinese case is better documented than those of the other claimants.  But the extent of the Chinese claims 
(and particularly the PRC's expansive and undefined "nine-dashed line" claim) remains 
ambiguous and contradictory. 
PRC interests in the EEZ is based mainly on the premise that vast oil reserves lie 
beneath the surface, reserves vital to China’s economic growth.  Beijing estimates that 
every one percent increase in GDP requires a 1.8% increase in oil consumption. 
 
Figure 1. South China Sea Territorial Claims by Surrounding Countries 
Source: Map taken from http://www.middlebury.edu/southchinasea 
Estimates based on the past decade and predictions for the next five years have Chinese 
growth approaching 8%.  The energy capacity within the PRC-claimed waters may 
become critical in the future as the untapped natural resources in that zone become 
economically feasible to draw upon.  China’s ability to assert its South China Sea claims 
has increased with the liberalization of the PLA economy.  The PRC’s rise as a regionally 
dominant power will continue to influence the way in which Spratly and Paracel 
maritime regions are divided up.  The ROC echoes Beijing’s claims in the South China 
12 
Sea.  If the PRC attains niche military parity with the United States, the South China Sea 
issue will be aggressively pursued with perceived outcomes favorable to China.  
3. Stabilize the Rule of the Communist Party 
In 1978, after the death of Mao and normalized diplomatic relations with the 
United States, Deng Xiaoping restored authority to the Chinese Communist Party as a 
decision-making entity based on its revolutionary legitimacy.  The constitution in 1982 
was revamped to allow Deng to pursue a two-pronged strategy.  According to American 
Sinologist Kenneth Lieberthal, Deng first loosened the ideological straitjacket of the 
party to create a general sense of new opportunities, excitement and support.13  The 
Cultural Revolution had been so disastrous to the Party’s legitimacy that Deng was able 
to build coalitions between conservatives and reformers to make sweeping changes.  The 
Third Plenum witnessed the failure of Hua Guofeng, Mao’s replacement, in his effort to 
hold back the backlash against the Cultural Revolution.  It was not ideology that failed 
Hua Guofeng or gave Deng Xiaoping victory.  Rather, it was Deng’s ability to build a 
coalition among erstwhile political enemies to implement his strategic vision for China’s 
economic and military development. 
From 1978 to 1984, Deng was successful with his reforms.  But eventually, within 
Deng’s ad-hoc coalition tensions rose to a point that they dominated subsequent policy 
making.14  However, routine had been restored to the political system, so that plenums 
were held as scheduled and consensus was regularly achieved between the two sides.  But 
the power struggle between Chen Yun, leader of the conservatives, and a Long March 
veteran, and Deng Xiaoping caused the reform movement to take on periods of policy 
loosening (fang) and tightening (shou). 
After 1984 regular plenums served only to mask rather than resolve differences of 
opinions among the party leaders.  Party compromises became reconciled through power 
struggles.15  Deng’s 1984 adoption of the “Decision on the Reform of the Economic 
Structure,” which ran counter to the course championed by the conservative Chen Yun, 
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created deep fault lines within the party.  The 1989 Tiananmen Square incident was 
interpreted as a visible consequence of the interplay clash between the two sides. 
The cycles of economic expansion and retrenchment reflected a divided party.  
Although Tiananmen was a result of intense party conflict, Deng never the less emerged 
victorious.  The political balancing of power has become the legacy of the Deng 
Xiaoping era.  In addition, Deng also laid the foundation for liberal economic reforms 
that have allowed the contradictory spectacle of the communist regime working to 
strengthen the foundations of a market economy. 
Deng’s era, which Jiang Zemin is extending, has left the party embroiled in 
constant power struggles between the two factions.  Jiang Zemin has become a power 
broker whose goal has been to maintain a forward-looking party direction while at the 
same time shoring up his power base.  “If Jiang Zemin did not stand up for Chinese 
sovereignty, he could be removed,” one of China’s senior military leadership is quoted as 
saying.  “It would not be a big thing.  We have a collective leadership.”16  By moderating 
his ideology, Jiang Zemin is able to maintain the spirit of Deng’s liberal economic 
reform.  This moderating trait is also what has allowed market reforms to take place 
within China to the extent that the PRC has now been given approval to enter the World 
Trade Organization. 
4. Regional Leadership 
Beijing publicly denounces the idea of China becoming a hegemon in the future.  
Sinologist Michael Pillsbury quotes Chinese documents as showing “the new Chinese-
style world system of the Five Principles will be much better than systems of the past and 
present, because there will be harmony, no ‘power politics,’ and no more ‘hegemony’.”17  
The Chinese may profess a desire to not become a world hegemon.  However, their 
actions, including the quest to build a robust military so that they can stand up to the 
West, as evidenced in the EP-3E incident of April 2001, indicate ambitions to regional 
hegemony.  The idea of respect upon which Beijing insists recalls that pursued by the 
Japanese following the Meiji Restoration.  The Chinese do not subscribe to Western 
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views of international relations as a choice between realism or liberalism.  “In contrast to 
Western research that suggests that miscalculation and misperceptions may be the leading 
cause of war, Chinese analysts assert that ‘scrambling for resources’ causes war,” 
according to U.S. Sinologist Michael Pillsbury.  “Economic factors are... the most 
fundamental cause triggering war."18  The Chinese reasoning, with its strongly 
Marxist/Leninist overlay, has some merit.  But from a U.S. perspective, it seems to fit 
easily into the neo-realist approach to power politics. 
“Strategic misdirection” was the Chinese explanation for the United States victory 
in the Cold War.  By keeping oil prices down, the United States was able to limit Soviet 
income.  The United States’ pursuit of the “Star Wars” defense platform brought about 
the collapse of the Soviet Union by economically bankrupting them.  Beijing concludes 
that China, even with its strong growth in GDP, is not yet in a position to challenge the 
United States and possibly may be at the receiving end of a “strategic misdirection” 
campaign.  The PRC fears that a “China threat” policy may result in the focus of United 
States defense technology against China. 
“Engagement” and “containment” have surfaced as the two strategies available to 
the United States in its dealings with the PRC.  “There is general agreement in the United 
States that Washington should use its influence to have Beijing conform to international 
norms and to foster changes overtime in China’s political, economic and security systems 
compatible with U.S. interests,”19 according to Kerry Dumbaugh a Congressional staffer.  
The Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations followed a strategy 
of engagement towards China.  At the outset of his administration, however G.W. Bush, 
labeled the PRC “Strategic Competitor.” Talk of strengthening security alliances with 
Japan, South Korea and Australia give the impression that Washington was set to pursue 
a strategy of containment vis-à-vis Beijing, although the events of September 11, 2001 
and the subsequent “war on terror” may have modified Washington’s policy somewhat. 
Bush’s views came as no surprise to Beijing, which contended that the “mistaken” 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and growing U.S. support for further 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Kerry B. Dumbaugh, “Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices,” CRS Report for 
Congress, Updated 15 March 2001; accessed on 2 May 2001; available from http://www.crs.web; Internet. 
15 
assistance to Taiwan’s defense already offered indications of Washington’s real policy.  
The TMD initiative is also perceived as being targeted against China and offers further 
proof to Beijing that U.S. intentions are hostile. 
The PRC wants to hold confrontation with the United States in abeyance, until its 
strength is sufficient to challenge the United States.  As mentioned previously, 2005 is 
the timeframe the United States intelligence services forecast that the PLA will be able to 
face successfully down the United States over Taiwan.  The two building blocks for 
Chinese success are an aggressive revolution in military affairs (RMA) for the PLA 
followed by the pursuit of a Russian alliance. 
B. PRC’S RMA 
1. China’s Advanced Military Capabilities 
In his book, China Debates the Future Security Environment, Michael Pillsbury 
argues that some PLA officers truly believe that the PRC will become an East Asian 
hegemon in the short term and will eventually equal the United States around the year 
2025.  In the short term, as the East Asian hegemon, China plans to circumscribe 
Taiwan’s political options through the continued production and targeting by the PLA of 
the CSS-6 missile system.  Beijing calculates that the PLA’s cruise missiles will 
intimidate Taiwan, while the PLA navy and air force deter third-party intervention. 
China’s focus on missile systems, naval assets and fourth generation fighters 
offers a credible strategy to achieve this goal.  In addition to recent acquisitions of 
technologically advanced weapon systems, Beijing, in its 1995-96 Taiwan Strait 
exercises demonstrated an intent to develop a joint operations capability.20  The weapon 
systems that China is purchasing abroad include the Kilo-class submarine, Sovremenny 
destroyer and Su-27 and Su-30 fighters.  In this way, the PLA can pose a direct threat to a 
U.S. carrier battle group that dares insinuate itself between China and Taiwan. 
Some may doubt China’s ability to tactically employ sophisticated weapon 
systems like the Sovremenny and the Kilo submarine.  But the fact that the PLA 
possesses these platforms means that the United States must consider them a credible 
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threat.  The Sovremenny is already equipped with the SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCM.  This 
poses a realistic challenge to a U.S. carrier battle group.  However, the Sovremenny as a 
“stand alone” weapon system is vulnerable to attack and counterattack.  Another report 
states that the Chinese are trying to acquire SS-N-27 anti-ship cruise missiles for the four 
Kilo submarines.21  A Kilo submarine armed with SS-N-27 missiles would be a greater 
threat to U.S. surface ships than China’s SS-N-22-armed Sovremenny-class destroyer, 
since detecting a submarine is a far greater challenge than detecting a surface vessel. 
The acquisition of modern fourth generation fighters is paramount to the success 
of PLA strategy because most of its indigenous PLA fighter aircraft are obsolete, even 
antiquated 1950s era technology.  The Su-27 and Su-30 are and will be a significant 
upgrade over China’s existing inventory and are comparable to the U.S. F-15C air 
superiority fighter.  The combination of the PLA’s AA-11 AAM and either the SU-27 or 
SU-30 fighter could prove a vexing air to air challenge for current day fighter aircraft of 
other Asian and U.S. forces.22  “The effectiveness of the Su-27, for instance, will depend 
on a large part on how well these fighter aircraft are supported by, and integrated with, 
any future PLA aerial refueling, airborne early warning, and electronic warfare 
capabilities,” according to the report to Congress.23 
2. Military Allies 
China’s indigenous advances in missile technology, due mainly to U.S. 
technology being sold to China during the 1990’s, have directly affected U.S. policy 
towards the Far East.  National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD) are advertised as defenses against North Korean aggression.  But some may see 
the system as concentrating on protection from China.  U.S. defense initiatives like NMD 
and TMD appear to be pushing China and Russia to form a PRC-Russian strategic 
partnership against the sole superpower.  In July 2000 several Chinese sources reported 
that Russian President Vladimir Putin told Chinese President Jiang Zemin that in the 
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event of conflict between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, he would 
order the Russian Pacific Fleet to block any intervention by the U.S. 7th Fleet.24  China 
and Russia have even held a joint exercise that simulated a Taiwan scenario.  Therefore, 
not only is China trying to purchase a naval fleet and a fourth generation air force. It is 
also hoping that the Russian Pacific fleet might support it during critical junctures, as 
forecasted for the 2005 time frame.  The flaw in this scenario is the diminishing 
capability of the Russian Pacific Fleet due to lack of funds.  The Jane’s article also 
mentioned China’s leasing of airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft from Russia, made 
necessary after the U.S. pressure on Tel Aviv caused the Israeli AEW deal to collapse.  
Nevertheless, the prospect of Sino-Russian cooperation in the Pacific has the potential to 
create problems for U.S. military planners attempting to game a crisis over Taiwan and/or 
the South China Sea, because it would constitute an unwanted escalation. 
More recently it has been reported that the PRC has pursued the acquisition of 
forward naval bases in Myanmar25 and Pakistan.26  A PLAN fleet located in the Indian 
Ocean would create a whole new set of challenges for the United States.  The PRC’s 
acquisition of advanced weapons and forward basing combined with a military alliance 
with Russia serves to underline China’s resolve to be taken seriously as an Asian power, 
and to settle the Taiwan question on its own terms. 
C. US: GOALS IN WESTERN PACIFIC 
The G.W. Bush Administration, which took office in January 2001, was eager to 
distance itself from what it saw as a policy of appeasement of Beijing followed by the 
Clinton Presidency.  A Rand study entitled The United States and Asia: Toward a New 
U.S. Strategy and Force Posture, published in 2001, characterized the Clinton 
Administration’s policy in the following way: “The United States should seek to 
influence the region [Asia] in a manner that fosters the development of democratic, 
are willing and able to abide by current international norms market-oriented societies that                                                  
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of behavior and, eventually, to cooperate in the manner of the democratic European 
nations so that major armed conflicts among them become unthinkable.”27  Despite, the 
terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001, which have pushed Washington and Beijing 
closer together, there is scant evidence that the Bush Administration has wavered in its 
commitment to Taiwan to protect it from PRC intimidation. 
The perception in Washington that the PRC is a rising power with hegemonic 
aspirations influences U.S. policy in the Far East.  The Rand study concluded that it is 
paramount for the United States to remain the stabilizing force in the Western Pacific 
until East Asia functions as a group of democratic nations able to resolve their differences 
peacefully.  The most consistent diplomatic/military stabilizer in the region is the 
USCINCPACCOM, currently commanded by Admiral Blair, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet.  
The United States policy in the Western Pacific rests on four pillars: maintain regional 
stability; shepard the Taiwan issue towards a peaceful resolution; keep open the SLOCs 
in the South China Sea; and, finally, oversee the continued development of trade. 
1. Regional Stability 
The rise of China as a regional economic and military power in the post-Cold War 
era has brought about a shift in focus in the United States from Europe to the Asian-
Pacific region.28  While the United States has exercised a stabilizing influence within 
Europe as a leader of NATO, the Asia-Pacific lacks such a multilateral organization.  
Therefore, Washington maintains its influence in the Far East through official bilateral 
ties with its allies Japan, South Korea and Australia, and at the same time maintains 
unofficial bilateral ties with Taiwan.  The way in which the reliability of the United 
States is perceived as an ally and “balancer” in the region will have a pivotal influence on 
the strategic behavior of the United States allies. 
A strong U.S.-Japan security alliance will be critical for the Asian-Pacific post-
Cold War era, just as it was during the Cold War.  Both the United States and Japan, and 
indeed nations throughout the region, recognize the alliance as critical to their interests of 
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regional peace and stability.29  As an ally and balancer, the United States has two critical 
advantages according to the recent Rand study:  “It is powerful, and it is far away and 
hence is less likely to be seen as a direct threat.” 30  In September 1997, Japan 
strengthened its commitment to rear area support of U.S. forces engaged in the region.31  
The Bush Administration quickly reaffirmed Japan’s importance to regional stability.  
Japan’s commitment takes on a greater importance, given Beijing’s increasingly assertive 
posture in the region. 
Cold War alliances are still critical in the post-Cold War era.  Following the 1951 
U.S. Japan Security Treaty, Japan was solely allied with the United States.  Likewise, the 
post-Korean War U.S. ROK treaty established the alliance between the United States and 
South Korea.  The strong US-ROK deterrence posture has contributed to the diplomatic 
successes on the easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula.  A unified Korea allied to 
the United States would serve as a counterweight to an Asia split between China and 
Japan.  In addition, a strong bilateral security relationship would protect U.S. interests on 
the peninsula and in East Asia.32  The Bush Administration’s initial view of China as a 
“strategic competitor” highlighted the importance of secure bilateral ties with South 
Korea and possibly a unified Korea.  An attempt to increase ties to form a multilateral 
agreement among United States allies in the region would undoubtedly include South 
Korea. 
In the summer of 2001, Australia proposed a new Asia security forum to include 
the United States, Australia, Japan and South Korea.  This would undoubtedly firm up the 
commitment by the Bush Administration to remain engaged in the Asian-Pacific region.  
Australia, another long time ally, is a critical partner for the United States in the Asian-
Pacific post-Cold War era, just as it was during the Cold War.  The drawback of this 
approach is that by working actively to create a multilaterally defined organization, the 
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United States in its attempt to reassure its allies of its commitment to the Asia Pacific, 
will send Beijing the message that it is being “contained.” 
The 2001 Annual Report to the President and the Congress by Secretary of 
Defense William S. Cohen asserts that the success United States strategy hinges on strong 
alliance relationships within the region, especially with Japan, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) and Australia.33  In addition, “the continued strengthening of U.S. security 
dialogues and confidence building measures with members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the ASEAN Regional Forum is one of many 
ways the United States is working to enhance political, military and economic ties with 
Allies and friends in Southeast Asia.”34  The United States military presence or, at the 
very least easy access to the Far East, is critical for two reasons:  first, it reassures 
strategic allies of the U.S. commitment to that region.  Second, it allows a real capability 
for the United States to implement war plans in the vastness of the Pacific. 
With the support of regional allies, the United States could reduce its permanent 
force structure in its Pacific area of responsibility.  For example the United States could 
rely on guaranteed access for an influx of military assets during a crisis.  One example of 
many possibilities would be to extend security cooperation with the Philippines.  The 
Philippines could allow frequent rotating deployments of U.S. forces.35  Of course any 
initial response to a Taiwan situation would involve the Navy.  But as the Philippines are 
critically located to cover contingencies in the South China Sea, the islands may become 
a key factor in future U.S. strategic policy. 
A delicate balance between the reduction of forces and bases in a caretaker status 
will undoubtedly be watched closely by the United States’ long-time allies in the region, 
not to mention by Beijing.  As mentioned previously, the role of the United States as a 
stabilizing force is viewed by many regional players as critical, especially in a time when 
China is rising as a regional power.  However, since the multilateral security alliance 
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proposal by Australia, there has been little action by the players involved to develop 
further the idea.  U.S. bilateral policies in the Far East may be interpreted by China as 
being ambiguous.  The PRC may choose to interpret ambiguity as a green light to make 
an aggressive move toward Taiwan. 
2. Peaceful Resolution of Taiwan Issue 
For over fifty years, the United States has been able to protect Taiwan from 
assimilation into the PRC against its will.  With the full normalization of U.S.-PRC 
relations in 1979, it could be said that the Cold War with the PRC was over.  This was 
confirmed as Chinese communist economic policy began to abandon socialist principles 
and evolve toward capitalism.  Bilateral relations, between Washington and Beijing are 
based on the so-called “three communiqués” of 1972, 1978 and 1982.  The second 
communiqué the United States accepted Beijing’s “one China” formula that accepted that 
Taiwan is part of China.  However, Taiwan’s development as an economic power and 
robust democracy has created a dilemma for both Beijing and Washington.  The more 
Taiwan evolves, the less likely it will willingly join the PRC and the less likely 
Washington will stand aside and allow Beijing forcibly to integrate Taipei into the PRC. 
The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis occurred in reaction to the U.S. decision to give 
then ROC President LeeTeng-hui a visa to the United States.  The PRC orchestrated 
overtly aggressive amphibious maneuvers and missile launches by the PLA.  This 
directly challenged the United States determination to ensure the Taiwan situation was 
resolved peacefully.  At that time, political tensions were mounting within the PRC over 
the possibility of the Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate winning 
the presidency in the Taiwanese elections.  The DPP’s whose platform included a free 
and independent Taiwan.  The PRC reacted with a show of military force by launching 
two SRBM’s towards Taiwan during an exercise that coincided with the elections.  The 
United States twice responded with the deployment of CVBGs to the Taiwan Straits in 
November 1995 and March 1996.  The PLA curtailed its exercises.  The United States 
recalled its carriers and the Taiwan situation returned to the status quo. 
The policies formulated by United States administrations since Harry Truman 
have proven successful in allowing Taiwan to evolve toward capitalism and democracy.  
Taiwan’s ability to keep Beijing at bay has been due largely to the fact that an unhappy 
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Congress enacted legislation in 1979 to permit continued U.S. support for Taiwan 
independence.  This legislation, which is more than 20 years old, is called the Taiwan 
Relations Act.  “Of particular importance in the current environment is Section 3 of the 
TRA, dealing with U.S. defense commitments to Taiwan. Section 3 is non-specific about 
the defense articles and services the United States will provide.  It merely calls for ‘such 
defense articles and services…as may be necessary,’ and gives Congress a role in 
determining what needs Taiwan may have.” 36  The TRA’s section 3 contradicts the 1982 
communiqué between Washington and Beijing, which committed the United States 
slowly to reduce the quantity and quality of arm sales to Taiwan.  The ambiguity of the 
United States policy has been the lynchpin for continued success in allowing Taiwan 
freely to pursue self-determination. 
3. The United States and the South China Sea 
Since 1995, the United States views freedom of navigation in the South China Sea 
(SCS) as vital to its national security interests.  The sea lanes of communication (SLOC) 
of the SCS, as depicted on the map below, Figure 2, are the economic conduits for 
Northeast Asia, through which vital oil and imports as well as exports of finished 
products throughout the world.  The SLOC’s secondary importance concerns U.S. Naval 
forces transiting to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.  That the SCS remains a 
potential hot spot cannot be in doubt.  The April 2001 EP-3E incident was simply the 
latest in a list of confrontations in the SCS that include the Chinese take over of the 
Paracel Islands in 1974, the occupation of six reefs in 1988, and subsequent reef 
occupation incidents in 1992 and 1995.  The SCS is part of China’s main focus for 
economic expansion which it is prepared to back by military power.  Protection of 
Chinese claims, which includes most of the South China Sea, will require a large and 
capable U.S. fleet.  United States policy with regards to freedom of the sea firmly agrees 
with and actively supports the UNCLOS III Law of the Sea agreement, which puts 
restrictions on claims made on the high seas. 
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 Figure 2. The SLOC’s of the South China Sea 
Source: Map taken from http://www.middlebury.edu/southchinasea 
 
4. Globalized Trade 
The United States is the world’s biggest proponent of free trade, primarily 
because it strengthens the U.S. economy.  The major countries of East Asia have also 
reaped the benefits from the increased globalization of trade.  Taiwan, in particular, with 
its “miraculous transition” was quickly identified as one of the Asian-Pacific’s financial 
leaders.  The United States and its allies depend upon sea-lane access, which continues 
the integration of world markets.  Areas of the world such as the South China Sea have 
become critical choke points for trade.  The U.S. Navy has been essential in guaranteeing 
freedom of the seas so that free trade would flourish. 
Economic interdependence may be seen as the best way for the Taiwan situation 
to be defused.  The PRC’s and the ROC’s accession in 2002 into the World Trade 
Organization demonstrates the PRC’s increasing integration into the world economy.  But 
the fact still remains that Taiwan has a unique history.  Even as the United States and the 
24 
PRC increase their economic ties, incidents like the EP-3E collision indicate that 
economic self-interest alone cannot keep two nation-states from tangling in a quarrel.  
Even as economic ties between the PRC and the ROC have increased tremendously in the 
1990’s, the PRC defense white papers have stepped up the menacing tone of their 




















The scenario begins in January 2005, after a political watershed year, including 
presidential elections in both the United States and Taiwan, followed by elections in the 
Legislative Yuan, the Taiwanese Parliament, in December 2004.  Presidents Bush 
(Republican) and Chen Shui-bian (DPP) were both re-elected.  However, there was a 
power shift in the Legislative Yuan.  Until now, the KMT had maintained 46.4 per cent, 
or 123 seats, in parliament against 29.6 percent for the DPP.  A rise in nationalistic 
sentiment among the Taiwanese catapulted the DPP into control of the body with 130 
seats against the 70 seats for the KMT. 
In Beijing, the CCP had undergone a “changing of the guard” in the autumn of 
2002, as General Secretary Jiang Zemin of the Communist Party stepped down and new, 
younger communist leaders took office.  China’s economy has maintained the eight 
percent growth rate and is now ranked third behind those of the United States and Japan.  
The Communist Party successfully engaged the revolution in military affairs (RMA) at 
the turn of the century.  The PLA believes that the government is prepared to utilize its 
modern, high-tech arsenal of electronic warfare, including cyber war and anti-satellite 
weapons, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles to realize PRC objectives toward 
Taiwan.  However, China has attained great success in the RMA and continues to 
modernize its conventional forces, the PLA has yet to be put to the test. 
The Russian Pacific Fleet is able to maintain an “Eskardo,” as the Russians call it, 
which is equivalent to a U.S. battle group.  The Sino-Russian strategic partnership has 
blossomed into a yearly joint exercise during the month of June, in which the two 
militaries practice invading an island, closing off the SLOCs through the South China Sea 
and attacking two CVBGs.  In the United States, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act 
has still not passed the Senate.  The Democratic controlled Senate believed the Taiwan 
Relations Act to be sufficient and favors a policy of engagement through trade with 
China.  U.S. arm sales to Taiwan have not been as robust as Taiwan would have liked and 
Aegis cruisers and fast-attack submarines have yet to be approved.  In the PRC’s eyes, 
the critical political linkages between the United States and Taiwan have yet to develop 
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in the 21st century.  The lack of truly state-of-the-art advanced arm sales and the failure to 
implement the TMD initiative is casting doubt on whether the United States will actually 
intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in the case of Chinese aggression.  In addition, the United 
States is heavily distracted by its war on terrorism, casting doubt on whether the United 
States still sees Taiwan as a top priority. 
B. TIMELINE 
The main events of the crisis are as follows: 
January 5, 2005 
Washington is unable to install the TMD system on Taiwan since the TSEA failed 
to pass the Senate.  This has caused President Bush to follow through with his threat, 
made in May 2001 at the time of the authorization of the sale of four Kidd class 
destroyers.  Now, the sale of Aegis cruisers and fast-attack submarines to Taiwan will be 
approved.  White House officials say that this move reflects a longstanding U.S. 
commitment to help Taiwan to defend itself.  China announces that the “imperialist” 
United States is continuing its effort to meddle in China’s internal affairs.  In a State of 
the Union Address, President Bush states the U.S. policy on Taiwan by saying,  “Read 
my lips!  We will do what ever it takes to defend Taiwan!” 
January 15, 2005 
Since the KMT defeat in the Legislative Yuan elections, President Chen has 
stated privately that he will work with the DPP-controlled body to shorten the timetable 
for Taiwanese independence. Beijing’s Xinhua News Agency quotes unnamed PLA 
sources that state that Taiwan is on a collision course for a military confrontation. 
January 17, 2005 
The PLA force structure is strengthened along the coastline facing Taiwan.  
Fifteen Chinese troop carriers transporting landing craft move down from Shanghai to 
dock at the Fujian port of Xiamen.  This gives the PRC a total of 45 landing craft across 
the Strait from Taiwan.  While Quemoy is near the mainland, it is 175 kilometers across 
the Taiwan Strait from the mainland to Taiwan. PLA-AF SU-30s continue to harass U.S. 
surveillance planes, which are ordered to remain 100 miles off the coast of China. 
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January 19, 2005 
Taiwan’s defense minister says China is massing troops for a large scale 
amphibious assault exercise, foreshadowing a Taiwan invasion scenario. 
January 20, 2005 
China allows CNN International to do a piece on the 600-plus missiles pointed at 
Taiwan.  Wolf Blitzer does a compelling piece on the resolve of the Chinese people to be 
reunited with their Taiwanese brethren.  But Blitzer is quick to point out that the 2001 
U.S. arms sales of AMRAAM air defense system, in addition to the successful delivery 
of the four Kidd Class Destroyers and the upgraded Patriot III Air defense system, cast 
into doubt China’s ability to pose a credible threat to Taiwan. 
It is possible, however, that Beijing has drawn the opposite conclusion a recent 
PLA internal paper that has fallen into U.S. hands argues that the TMD has not been 
incorporated into Taiwan’s defense and Washington will not protect Taiwan in a crisis.  
Instead, the paper argues, the United States has been using TMD as a bargaining chip for 
economic issues.  Through the integration of U.S. intelligence efforts and command and 
control systems with those of Taiwan, TMD would demonstrate on both the political and 
military levels a firm resolve to defend Taiwan.  Without any effective way to defend 
Taiwan, the United States will most likely not risk a CVBG to secure Taiwan and instead 
fall back on its ambiguous Taiwan policy as an excuse not to intervene. 
January 25, 2005 
China proposes a two-year incremental plan to do away with trade barriers on 
U.S. automobiles, which was to occur prior to required barrier drops as outlined in the 
WTO phase-in process.  The U.S. auto industry would then have a free reign to sell cars 
to a population of over one billion people.  In the same press release, China mentions that 
it is close to signing the largest contract ever with Boeing.  Both transactions offer a 
boost to the U.S. economy and a way to offset somewhat America’s huge trade imbalance 
with the PRC. 
February 2, 2005 
The PLA announces military exercises scheduled for February 15. 
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February 4, 2005 
President Putin announces that the Russian Navy will join the PLA exercise 
scheduled for February 15.  Of note: last June’s annual joint Sino-Russian exercise came 
to an alarming conclusion as elements of the Russian Fleet remained in the South China 
Sea for nearly 90 days.  Ostensibly, this was because both Beijing and Moscow are leery 
of the U.S. acting unilaterally as it did in Kosovo in 1999.  Some elements in the CCP 
argue that a crisis over Taiwan might bring on a demonstration of U.S. air power such as 
that used against Belgrade and Afghanistan in 2001.  Others believe that, with elements 
of the Russian fleet operating in the South China Sea for an extended period, the United 
States will approach the Taiwan situation more cautiously. 
China’s news agency again transmits warnings towards Taiwan about the dangers 
of independence. 
February 5, 2005 
The China Business Council led by Boeing, Motorola, Caterpillar, AT&T, and the 
American industrial group “Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade” step up their 
lobbying to deter President Bush from confronting Beijing over Taiwan, lest a crisis 
damage their profits.  However, during his State of the Union address, the President 
reaffirms that the United States will defend Taiwan if the island is attacked. 
The Russian news agency Itar-Tass announces that the Russian Pacific Fleet has 
taken station in the South China Sea during the Chinese exercise. 
February 7, 2005 
In the evening the PLA announces a live fire exercise of the JL-2 missile from 
their newly commissioned class of the Type 094 class nuclear submarine (SSBN), in 
addition to an amphibious landing exercise to take place between February 15h and 20th.  
Recent intelligence reports have verified the PLA’s much improved cruise missile 
technology.  In fact, the improved accuracy of the new missiles is such that they are now 





February 8, 2005 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reopens the Taiwan debate.  Beijing’s 
Xinhua News Agency calls on the DPP to put more emphasis on the reunification with 
the mainland.  Otherwise, Taiwan could force a military confrontation. 
February 12, 2005 
CNNT (Taiwan) reports large-scale power grid failures all over Taiwan except for 
key industrial sites and the Taipei Airport.  They also report massive cell phone failures 
throughout the capital.  Beijing has no comment. 
February 15, 2005 
The United States dispatches the ready carrier battle group, led by the USS Kitty 
Hawk, to take up station in the Taiwan region.  The battle group contains Aegis cruisers 
and is also accompanied by three newly commissioned stealth missile gunboats along 
with the command and control ship USS Blue Ridge.  Estimated time of arrival for the 
CVBG is 18 February.  Simultaneously, the U.S. Administration announces the approval 
of the sale of eight Aegis cruisers and eight fast-attack submarines to Taiwan, with the 
caveat that delivery will not occur until the summer of 2012.  Beijing reacts angrily and 
threatens to cancel plans to drop trade barriers on U.S. automobiles and cancel the Boeing 
contract. 
Internal PRC party documents later show that the increased political ties between 
the United States and Taiwan, together with the power projection of the carrier battle 
group and the sale of advance weaponry, convincingly demonstrate an unconditional U.S. 
commitment to back Taiwan. 
February 16, 2005 
Taiwan’s defense minister states on CNNT (Taiwan) that his nation’s air defense 
mainframe computers have come under attack by an unknown source, but that Taipei has 
ample back-up systems to maintain Taiwan’s defense shield (which is not true).  U.S. 
Secretary of State Powell pointedly blames China for increased cyber warfare attacks on 
Taiwan.  Secretary Powell adds that China is clandestinely attacking Taiwan’s economy 
and that the United States will support its ally. 
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February 18, 2005 
Powell, at an impromptu press release, announces that the United States is 
canceling the 25 February port visit in Manila for the Ronald Reagan Battle Group, 
which is on its return transit home from the Persian Gulf.  The battle group will be 
redirected to take up station south of Taiwan. 
February 20, 2005 
The PLA announces the conclusion of the successful sub-launched JL-2 missile 
test firing and states it will continue with the amphibious exercise, but on a much smaller 
scale.  Beijing offers no further comment on this change of plans. 
February 22, 2005 
China announces that its amphibious landing exercise is complete and that all 
forces will return to their home bases.  The United States announces that it will withdraw 
the U.S. aircraft carriers currently operating in the area.  Beijing had concluded that war 
with the United States was imminent if the DPP and President Chen had gone public with 
legislation for an independent Taiwan.  Beijing believed it could have defeated the carrier 
battle groups, but felt the United States would resort to the use of nuclear weapons upon 
losing two carrier battle groups.  The willingness to send two carrier battle groups to the 
area was enough to demonstrate the U.S. commitment towards Taiwan. 
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IV. NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE ECONOMIC IMPACT 
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE AND THE 
ECONOMY 
The United States is a maritime nation dependent on external commerce for its 
economic livelihood.  On any given day, fifty percent of the U.S. Navy’s active fleet is 
underway and more than a third is forward deployed.37  In addition, ninety five percent of 
U.S. trade is transported by sea, which represents 20 percent of America’s GDP.38  The 
Navy has long argued that its role in the global economy is to be forward-deployed.  
Naval Forward Presence brings four primary benefits: 1) it deters the outbreak of war; 2) 
the Navy is positioned to respond rapidly to crises; 3) U.S. Naval Forward Presence 
shapes the future security environment through engagement; 4) finally, Naval Forward 
Presence demonstrates U.S. resolve in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.  These 
benefits remain valid at the onset of the new millennium.  The Navy continues to be the 
prime protector of the U.S. economic security, whose importance and fragility were 
revealed by the recent terror attacks. 
1. Economic security as a United States National Security Interest 
“From the founding of the republic, our economic expansion has been largely a 
product of foreign trade—initially raw materials and later, manufactured goods,” writes 
Captain Sam Tangredi.  “Today, the product includes information, but even this travels 
over routes that pass through sea, air, littoral, space and cyberspace mediums in which 
the Navy operates.”39  The livelihood of all U.S. citizens depends on the government’s 
commitments and policies relating to the domestic and global economy.  A strong 
economy is one of the core requirements for the United States in pursuit of national 
security goal.  Much hinges on the successful management of the value of the U.S. dollar, 
which is a key component of the world global economy.  There are mechanisms in place, 
                                                 
37 Robert Looney, “Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence: Benefits, Linkages and Future 
Prospects as Modified by Trends in Globalization,” September 30, 2001; accessed on 20 October 2001; 
available from http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/; Internet. Appendix A. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Sam J. Tangredi, “The Fall and Rise of Naval Forward Presence,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 
May 2000; accessed on 20 October 2001; available from 
http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles00/protangredi.htm; Internet. 
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such as Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve that play a global as well as a national 
role in the management of the economy as it responds to market forces.  But U.S. Naval 
Forward Presence provides the stabilizing presence for the national and global economy. 
2. Naval Postgraduate Schools Study on Naval Forward Presence 
The direct linkages between the economy and Naval Forward Presence have been 
suggested for years.  But until recently, no direct quantitative findings have connected the 
two.  A new approach to quantify the economic benefits from Naval Forward Presence 
was required framed in terms that are easily understood.  Professor Robert Looney’s 
October 1997 study worked from three basic assumptions.  First, oil markets should 
provide an index of the manner in which markets assess the economic consequences of 
crisis and Naval Forward Presence/crisis response.  Second, oil futures prices reflect 
market expectations based on available economic, political and military information.  
Third, if Naval Forward Presence is perceived as providing a stabilizing role, then Naval 
crisis response should decrease futures prices.  After analyzing three case studies in 
which the Navy was directly involved, significant economic benefits can be attributed to 
Naval Forward Presence/crisis response.  The following graph, Figure 3, shows how the 










 Figure 3. Spot Oil Prices for Desert Storm 
Source: Robert Looney and David Schrady, "Estimating Economic Benefits of Naval 
Forward Presence," Naval Postgraduate School technical report NPS-OR-01-004, 
October 2000; accessed on 20 October 2001; available from 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/QDR2Finales.pdf; Internet. 
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produce significant positive impacts when they influence forward markets and ripple 
through the economy. 
A second study concluded in October 2000 reinforced conclusions about the 
positive economic impact of Naval Forward Presence.  The October 2000 study utilized 
event analysis, which makes it possible statistically to link changes in market prices to 
Naval fleet movements.  In addition, crisis events that the Navy responded to are shown 
to affect in the short and longer term the pattern and movement in the dollar/yen 
exchange rate, commodity indexes and major stock exchanges.  More specifically for the 
purpose of  this thesis, the study utilized the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996, which was an 
apparent non-oil case. 
3. Taiwan Case Study 
The Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995-6 proved to be exceptional as initial indications 
were that it would be a non-oil case.  The second study calculated that the measure of 
impact from the crisis on the United States gross domestic product was most probably in 
the range of $3.4 billion (in 1995 dollars).  The following flow chart (Figure 4) depicts 
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Figure 4 Flow Chart of Economic Benefits of Taiwan Straits Crisis 
Source: Robert Looney. and David Schrady. "Estimating Economic Benefits of Naval 
Forward Presence," Naval Postgraduate School technical report NPS-OR-01-004, 




The result of Naval Forward Presence and its ability quickly to respond to critical 
events as in the Taiwan Strait crisis demonstrates a positive impact on a variety of 
markets including oil.  The study points out that the final impact on the U.S. economy 
depends on the strength of these market linkages, within the framework of globalization.  
Naval Forward Presence and globalization compliment each other with an end result of a 
stronger U.S. economy. 
B. GLOBALIZATION TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE 
A third study completed in October 2001 by Dr. Looney examines the linkages 
between Naval Forward Presence/crisis response and oil prices in the context of changes 
in the global economy and on the various dimensions of globalization.40  The study in 
concert with the latest study published by National Defense University, The Global 
Century: Globalization and National Security, examines a multitude of countries that 
were divided into the endogenous growth countries and the developing countries.  The 
two groups constitute the majority of world trade and production.  The following table 
summarizes the findings of the oil shock impact analysis: 
______________________________________________________ 
                              Globalization  Dimension Impact            Oil Shock       Naval  
                       _________________________________        Strength       Forward 
                     General       Structural     Financial         Global    Over        Presence 
               Globalization    Openness  Globalization     Growth   Time 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Group 1 Countries 
United States +    + ++ 
Australia + + +  (-) ++ 
Austria + + (-)  + ++ 
Canada +   + + ++ 
Finland + + + (-) + ++ 
France +    + ++ 
Germany + +  + + ++ 
Italy +    + ++ 
Netherlands + + ? + + ++ 
Sweden + + (-) (-) + ++ 
UK +    + ++ 
 
Japan +  (-)  + + 
Spain + + (-) (-) = + 
 
                                                 
40 Looney, Ibid.; Idem. “Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence: Benefits, Linkages and Future 
Prospects as Modified by Trends in Globalization.” 
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Group 2 Countries 
Korea (-) + + (-) = + 
Philippines (-) (-) +  + + 
Portugal (-)   (-) + + 
South Africa  (-)  + + + + 
 
Oil Countries 
Mexico (Gp 2) (-) (-)   = (-) 
Norway (Gp 1)(-) (-) + (-) (-) (-) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 1. Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis  
Source: Robert Looney, “Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence: Benefits, 
Linkages and Future Prospects as Modified by Trends in Globalization,” Unpublished 
technical report at Naval Postgraduate School, draft dated September 30, 2001; accessed 
on 20 October 2001; available from http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/; Internet. 
 
Table 1 indicates that oil shocks will continue to influence the industrial world, even 
though some argue that globalization will insulate the industrial world from further 
shocks in oil prices.  “The analysis found clear linkages between the globalization 
defined country groups and the manner in which oil shocks affect their economies.  Over 
time and contrary to popular opinion, Group 1 countries have become more vulnerable to 
oil price shocks in the sense that a 10 percent increase in the price of oil today would 
cause a greater reduction in income i.e., the oil shocks driven loss in income as a percent 
of GDP has increased gradually over time in line with the process of globalization.”41 
1. The United States Navy’s Role in Increased Globalization 
U.S. Naval Forward Presence with its ability to respond quickly and effectively to 
a crisis, combined with expanding globalization, will create a “virtuous cycle” of 
expanded world trade and economic growth.  Most importantly, the stabilization of oil, 
financial markets and exchange rates will stimulate rapid globalization, which in turn 
increases world growth.  The studies carried out at the Naval Postgraduate School have 
come a long way in proving the economic benefits of Naval Forward Presence.  There is 
no question but that the world economy has truly become globalized.  The key result is 
that Naval Forward Presence and crisis response mitigated oil shocks and returned prices 
                                                 
41Looney, Ibid,; Idem, “Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence: Benefits, Linkages and Future 
Prospects as Modified by Trends in Globalization.” 
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to their equilibrium levels.  The continuation of global trends will undoubtedly have a 
major impact on the industrial nations of the world, most notably the United States. 
2. Applying the Results to the 96 Taiwan Straits Case Study 
Chapter II of this thesis argues that China is arming with the strategic goal of 
projecting its power in East Asia, and that this constitutes a serious threat to U.S. Pacific 
interests.  With that in mind, Naval Forward Presence is the quickest, most effective tool 
to dissuade China from forceful unification of Taiwan and the pursuit of other regional 
hegemonic ambitions.  A direct byproduct of the effectiveness of Naval Forward 
Presence is the economic shock wave stabilization.  Therefore, the implications for 
forecasting that by 2005 the PRC will again begin to threaten Taiwan, lends support for a 
continued pursuit of a robust Navy that has the direct ability to be “forces for combat, 
shaping world events through presence”.42  A scenario of such a crisis is found in chapter 
III.  By applying the results of Dr. Looney’s study findings on the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits 
Crisis to a future potential crisis, one can conjecture the magnitude of economic savings 
the United States Navy will again bring to the economy in the event of a future crisis. 
3. Reinforcement of the Importance of Naval Forward Presence 
The potential for Chapter III’s scenario is very realistic based on the current 
course the PRC has undertaken.  Again, Naval Forward Presence with its effective ability 
quickly to respond to such a crisis, will again benefit the U.S. economy.  Applying the 
economic modeling based on Professor Looney’s studies, one could conclude that a 
conflict such as that in the scenario would only increase in the savings to the U.S. 
economy.  In 1995 dollars the savings was determined to be at 3.4 billion, while in 2005 
dollars that number could extend to over 5 billion in savings to the U.S. economy.  A 
higher dollar amount could be totaled if all of the countries in Table 1 were positively 
affected.  A future Taiwan crisis would have an even larger impact upon the global 
economy. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The situation in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait continues to be a delicate 
one.  Issues vital to the future stability of a region where the United States has 
considerable political and economic interests remain unresolved.  The region contains a 
number of “flashpoints,” any one of which could have a seriously destabilizing effect 
should they become activated -- the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, disputes over the Paracell 
and the Spratlys, or the continued instability in Indonesia to name but four.  The problem 
for Washington is the increasing volatility of these flashpoints.  The huge question mark 
in the equation is the role of the PRC.  The disappearance of the Soviet Union, Beijing’s 
growing economic and military might, its increasing assertiveness in its self-defined 
“Economic Exclusion Zone,” its hair trigger nationalism embedded in a sense of 
entitlement left unrequited after a “century of humiliation,” and the fragile sense of 
legitimacy of the Communist regime have combined to challenge a half-century of 
regional balance crafted by the United States. 
This thesis accepts as one of its fundamental premises the argument of Sinologist 
Michael Pillsbury, that the PRC’s survival may be linked to its ability to follow through 
with a combined economic, security and foreign policy that seeks to make China the 
regional hegemony by 2025.  The argument may certainly be made that Pillsbury offers a 
“worst case scenario” that incorporates a mournful vision of future Sino-U.S. relations.  
However, from the perspective of U.S. Naval Forward Presence and the QDR process, 
history and reason would argue against plans based on the optimistic assumptions that 
Washington and Beijing have few fundamental differences that cannot be resolved short 
of a show of force.  “Wars, Clausewitz’s reminds us, “is politics.”  Therefore, diplomacy 
and military power go hand-in-hand.  Of no region is this more true than the Taiwan 
Straits and the South China Seas. 
The “reunification” of Taiwan with the mainland and the disappearance of the 
rival ROC would be a vital stepping stone to Beijing’s strategy of becoming a regional 
hegemon.  On three occasions in the past, Beijing has attempted to invade, or at the very 
least intimidate, the ROC.  One premise of this thesis has been that the past supplies a 
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plausible guide to the future, all the more so because growing PRC assertiveness in the 
region makes another attempt to intimidate Taiwan in the near future more, not less 
likely.  As Beijing flexes its military muscle, it may calculate that U.S. power in the 
region has declined.  U.S. policy toward Taiwan has always been characterized by its 
“ambiguity”-- Washington recognizes Taiwan’s right to reject unification with the PRC, 
while acknowledging that Beijing has a historic claim on the off-shore island. 
Arguably, since 11 September 2001 and the rapprochement between the United 
States and the PRC to fight terrorism, that ambiguity has only increased.  Beijing may 
calculate that the United States and its military, particularly its naval forces, are 
overstretched, and that Washington is distracted by problems in the Islamic world.  It 
may seize this moment to act against Taiwan, at a time when the United States is least 
likely or able to respond.  The consequences of a successful intimidation of the PRC’s 
offshore nemesis would be a detachment of the ROC from U.S. protection, a policy shift 
in Taipei toward the PRC, followed by an incalculable credibility loss for the United 
States.  It takes only a tiny leap of the imagination to conjecture that Japan would begin 
seriously to rearm, North Korea emboldened to act against its southern rival, and Beijing 
inspired to advance into its “economic exclusion zone.”  All of these events would 
undermine the stability of the region and challenge America’s position there. 
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U.S. Naval Forward Presence has provided a significant – arguably the most 
important means – through which Washington has asserted its interests in the Western 
Pacific and maintained a regional balance of power there since the end of World War II.  
The central question posed by this thesis has been:  “Does U.S. Naval Forward Presence 
continue to be a viable means to protect U.S. interests and achieve U.S. policy goals in 
the region?”  The answer provided by this thesis is unequivocally “yes.”  Not only has 
U.S. Naval Forward Presence seriously modified PRC behavior in past crisis situations, 
but also, economic statistics have been mustered to prove that U.S. Naval Forward 
Presence stabilizes financial and oil markets, protecting U.S., and indeed world, 
economic interests.  This thesis argues that U.S. Naval Forward Presence will continue to 
be a vital ingredient in the future to provide stability in the Western Pacific and 
protecting, most importantly, U.S. economic interests.  It has demonstrated a plausible 
scenario for a PRC-U.S. confrontation over Taiwan set in 2005, the most likely time for a 
repeat of the 1995-96 crisis.  Based on the history of past confrontations, it concludes that 
U.S. Naval Forward Presence would both deter the PRC and protect U.S. strategic and 
economic interests in the Western Pacific.  To ensure favorable U.S. interests in the 
future, today’s planners and legislatures must invest in weapon systems that support and 
modernize U.S. Naval Forward Presence to maintain it as an effective tool of U.S. 
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